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We analyze the effects of changes in dividend tax policy using a life-cycle model of the firm, in which
new firms first access equity markets, then grow internally, and finally pay dividends when they have
reached steady state.
 
In accordance with the traditional view of dividend taxation, new firms raise less equity and invest
less the higher the level of dividend taxes. However, as postulated by the new view of dividend taxation,
the dividend tax rate is irrelevant for the investment decisions of internally growing and mature firms.
Since aggregate investment is dominated by these latter two categories, the level of dividend taxation
as well as unanticipated changes in tax rates have only small effects on aggregate investment.
Anticipated dividend tax changes, on the other hand, allow firms to engage in inter-temporal tax arbitrage
so as to reduce investors' tax burden. This can significantly distort aggregate investment. Anticipated
tax cuts (increases) delay (accelerate) firms' dividend payments, which leads them to hold higher (lower)
cash balances and, for capital constrained firms, can significantly increase (decrease) aggregate investment
for periods after the tax change.
The analysis of dividend taxation in a contestable democracy thus has to take into account future policy
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The economic eects of dividend taxation have been at the center of a erce academic
debate for decades. Proponents of the `traditional view' of dividend taxation (as discussed
e.g. in Poterba and Summers, 1985) stress that it raises the cost of equity nance. Hence,
they argue, it distorts rms' investment decisions, and higher dividend taxes decrease the
long-run capital intensity of an economy. The `new' or `tax capitalization view,' by contrast,
which was developed in King (1977) and Auerbach (1979), extending an earlier argument of
Stiglitz (1973),1 assumes that rms use retained earnings as the marginal source of nance;
the level of dividend taxation is thus irrelevant for their investment decisions.
In this paper, we explicitly take this controversy into account by modeling the life cycle
of rms. Following the discussion in Stiglitz (1973, 1976) and Sinn (1991), rms in our
model go through three stages: When they are started, their marginal source of nance is
equity markets, i.e. they issue new equity. As predicted by the traditional view, dividend
taxation is distortionary for such rms. In the second stage, rms grow internally by
retaining all their earnings until they reach their optimal size. In the nal stage, or steady
state, they pay out their earnings in the form of dividends. In Sinn (1991), the only way
for rms to carry resources from one period to the next is by rst investing into physical
capital, which exhibits strictly decreasing returns, and then liquidating the investment
the following period. This severely limits rms' ability to engage in intertemporal tax
arbitrage.
By contrast, this paper emphasizes that rms routinely hold cash or cash equivalents to
carry resources into the future, without being subject to the decreasing returns exhibited
by physical capital. This enables them to better arbitrage between dierent tax regimes,
with important eciency implications.
In our model, rms' steady state cash holdings are determined as a tradeo between
two considerations, imperfect access to capital markets and agency costs of holding cash:
We capture the rst consideration by assuming that investment opportunities arrive ran-
domly, yet that rms cannot raise new funds in capital markets instantaneously; they need
to carry cash on their balance sheets in order to take advantage of investment opportu-
nities. The second consideration is that because of agency problems, investors discount
future cash 
ows from rms at a higher rate than the returns of cash on hand. This as-
sumption captures a wide variety of models of agency concerns; a specic example that
motivates this discrepancy in discount rates from managerial myopia is given in appendix
A. The equilibrium level of cash balances trades o the expected benet of holding cash
1Stiglitz (1973) demonstrated that it was more tax-ecient to distribute funds to shareholders by
buying back shares than by paying dividends, with eective tax rates that are markedly lower than the
dividend tax rate (or even than the capital gains tax rate if the pay-out is treated as a return of principal).
The fact that so much money is nonetheless distributed through dividends has subsequently come to be
called the `dividend puzzle' (see Black, 1976).
We do not address this puzzle here { we simply assume that all payouts from the rm are subject to
the dividend tax, as if there were no stock repurchases. The results of our analysis are valid so long as
rms engage { at the margin { in intertemporal arbitrage. Even if they irrationally distribute funds in
the form of dividends, they can be and should be sensitive to the fact that by distributing dividends in
low-tax periods they increase shareholder value.
2for investment against the cost of holding cash balances; this implies that rms are capital
constrained in equilibrium.
As postulated by the traditional view of dividend taxation, we show that dividend
taxation is distortionary for young rms that need to issue new equity.2 Let us capture
the logic of this in the simplest possible model, where i represents the amount invested,
r is investors' required return and  the dividend tax rate. We can then dene a rm's
optimum amount of investment as the point where the investors' opportunity cost of funds
equals the marginal net return of funds.
1 + r = (1   )f
0(i)
The higher the dividend tax rate, the lower the return of rm investment to the shareholder,
and therefore the higher the required marginal gross product of capital and the lower the
amount of investment.
On the other hand, an internally growing or mature rm that nances investment out of
its cash reserves has to reduce its dividend in the current period, which entails a marginal
cost to shareholders of (1 )(1+r), and can distribute the payo of the investment next
period. The resulting equilibrium condition is
(1   )(1 + r) = (1   )f
0(i)
The tax rate cancels out of rms' optimality condition; a constant level of dividend tax-
ation therefore does not aect the investment decisions of internally growing or mature
rms that do not access equity markets. Since these two categories of rms dominate
aggregate investment, the eect of the level of dividend taxation on investment is low at a
macroeconomic level.
We employ the outlined model to investigate the eects of changes in the dividend tax
rate on macroeconomic variables such as aggregate investment. The impact of unantic-
ipated tax changes is generally small, since they aect only young rms that raise new
equity.
By contrast, anticipated tax changes entail eects that can be an order of a magni-
tude higher: they allow mature rms to engage in inter-temporal tax arbitrage by shifting
dividend payments from high-tax periods to low-tax periods. This involves signicant de-
viations from rms' optimal steady state levels of cash holdings, and since rms are capital
constrained, changes in their cash holdings can signicantly distort aggregate investment
and output.
An anticipated dividend tax cut allows rms to reduce investors' tax bill by postponing
dividend payments to the period in which the tax cut takes place. This implies that rms
carry larger cash balances in the meantime, which allows them to make larger investments
when an investment opportunity arrives.
By the same token, an anticipated dividend tax increase creates an incentive for rms
to accelerate their dividend payments, i.e. to take advantage of the low tax rate while it
2Implicitly, much of the literature on corporate taxation and investment has assumed the existence of
capital constraints; for in the absence of capital constraints, rms could always nance their investment
at the margin by debt; with interest payments tax deductible, there would be no marginal distortion. See
Stiglitz (1973, 1976). As we note later, our analysis is consistent with partial debt nancing at the margin.
3lasts by paying out a special dividend before the increase takes place. This leads to lower
cash balances and in turn lower investment in the following periods. Using the simplied
notation from above, an increase in the tax rate from L to H implies that paying out
dividends becomes comparatively cheaper than investing and distributing the payo under
a higher tax rate. The equilibrium level of investment i is then given by
(1   L)(1 + r) = (1   H)f
0(i)
When dividend taxes are expected to change, the tax terms no longer cancel; instead it is
easy to see that the required return for an investment is higher and the rm will invest
less:3
f
0(i) = (1 + r)
1   L
1   H
> 1 + r
A temporary dividend tax change can be viewed as an unanticipated change followed
by a second anticipated change in the opposite direction. As we argued, the eects of this
second anticipated change are likely to far outweigh any eects of the rst unanticipated
change. A temporary dividend tax cut, for example, is thus likely to have an overall nega-
tive eect on aggregate investment and output. Similarly, uncertainty about an impending
dividend tax increase can lead rms to reduce their cash holdings, with the corresponding
negative macroeconomic eects.
Lastly, we discuss the political economy implications of dividend taxation in a con-
testable democracy with two parties (denoted as conservatives and social democrats) that
have dierent preferences regarding dividend taxation and adjust the tax rate accordingly
when they come to power. Paradoxically, aggregate investment is higher under social
democratic rule, since rms expect a tax cut when that party loses power and hold higher
cash reserves in anticipation. Under a conservative regime, rms fear that dividend taxes
will go up when the party loses power; they thus pay out a larger amount of dividends,
which depresses their cash holdings and reduces aggregate investment.
Aside from providing new insights into the consequences of the temporary dividend tax
cuts that were introduced in the United States in 2003 and extended in 2006, this paper also
makes a point about the political economy of government policies of more general import:
in contestable democracies, the eects of policies have to be analyzed in the context of an
environment in which economic agents expect (stochastically) a change in decision makers
and in government policies. It is wrong simply to assume, as much of the political economy
literature has done heretofore, that government policies can be altered permanently. Policy
instability aects the behavior of economic agents, and decision makers have to rationally
take this into account in formulating their policies.
1.1 US Dividend Tax Policy in the Current Decade
In analyzing the implications of dividend tax policy on rm behavior and the macro-
economy, it is important to take account of both implemented tax changes and expectations
3Note that for simplicity, this simple two-period example of a tax increase abstracts from the dierence
between a rm's cash holdings and physical capital { as much of the existing literature does. For tax cuts,
a thorough analysis necessitates that cash holdings are explicitly taken into account, as we do in the full
model in section 2.
4thereof. In the United States dividends used to be taxed at the personal income tax rate
of up to 38:6% until 2003. CBO (2003) estimated the resultant average eective tax rate
on dividends to be around 19%, since many savings vehicles and shareholders were exempt
from dividend taxation. In his campaign for the 2000 presidential election, George W.
Bush ran on a platform of lowering taxes so as to reduce the high predicted scal surplus
over the coming decade, yet he never specically addressed the possibility of a reduction
in dividend taxation. Still rational, forward-looking rms must have assigned a small, but
positive probability to such a policy. In late December 2002, a plan to cut dividend taxes
was rst announced.4 Finally, in May 2003, the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act (JGTRRA) was passed: the personal income tax on corporate dividends was reduced
to a nominal rate of up to 15% (or an estimated eective rate of 5%, see CBO, 2003) with
a retroactive start at the beginning of 2003 and an expiration date of 2008.
While many conservatives argued that the tax cut should be made permanent, an
increasing number of critics called for an early repeal, especially after the anticipated scal
surplus quickly disappeared and the country was confronted with enormous scal decits.
The critics included Senator Kerry who ran against President Bush in the 2004 presidential
elections. During the election campaigns of 2004, rms must thus have assigned a positive
probability to all three events { the scheduled expiration of the tax cuts in 2008 as well as
an extension or an early repeal. This latter possibility made it optimal to pay out large
dividends in 2004, as exemplied by a $32bn special dividend by Microsoft.
When Bush won re-election in 2004, expectations adjusted again: an early repeal of
the tax cut no longer seemed likely. Instead, a special budget reconciliation bill in May
2006 extended the dividend tax cuts to the end of 2010. At least partly as a result of these
policies, the fraction of dividends in national income jumped from 4.4% in 2003 to almost
6% in 2006 { a level not seen since 1936.5
President Bush continues to call for making the dividend tax reductions permanent,
where \permanent" has to be understood in the context of a political economy in which
future governments are likely to change course again, as we discuss in section 5. How-
ever, after the Democrat gained control of both Houses of Congress in the 2006 mid-term
elections, a permanent extension appears unlikely.
1.2 The Current Debate on Dividend Taxation
A number of researchers have investigated the impact of this policy change on rms' payout
behavior empirically. There is evidence that the tax cut has led to a signicant increase
in both special and regular dividend payouts (see e.g. Blouin et al., 2004; Chetty and
Saez, 2005), consistent with our view that the policy change induced rms to engage in
intertemporal tax arbitrage.6
4For a detailed overview of the relevant events see table 1 in Auerbach and Hassett (2007).
5Data from the webpage of the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce,
http://www.bea.gov, table 1.12.
6It is also likely that part of the observed increase in dividends was due to cyclical and secular increases
in rm prots and due to substitution between share repurchases and dividends, as suggested e.g. by
Brown et al. (2007). However, according to Chetty and Saez (2006), the existing data is not yet sucient
to provide a denite answer to this question. In our analysis, the distinction between regular and special
5Chetty and Saez (2005) and Brown et al. (2007) also document that rm responses
to the dividend tax cut diered depending on the specic incentives faced by executives
and shareholders. For example, rms with large inside ownership or a large and in
uential
outside shareholder that is subject to dividend taxation were more likely to raise dividends
in response to the tax cut; managers holding options (with a strike price that is typically
not adjusted for dividend payments) were less inclined to pay out dividends. Our model
describes the behavior of representative rms, where managers maximize the present dis-
counted value of the net (after tax) dividends, given a discount rate that re
ects agency
considerations. With dierent ownership structures, dierent agency problems, dierent
tax incentives, and dierent potential investment opportunities, rms will pursue diernt
policies.7 While we could capture this by varying the set of parameters that we use to
describe the representative rm, our basic insights, that the rst order eects of a (tempo-
rary) dividend tax cut arise from the intertemporal arbitrage to which it gives rise, would
be unaected.
Amromin et al. (2006) and Auerbach and Hassett (2006, 2007) nd that the tax cut
also had a signicantly positive eect on the share prices of high dividend-paying stocks,
which suggests that their marginal cost of equity nance was reduced. In popular opinion,
such ndings have often been interpreted as an indication that the dividend tax cut had a
positive eect on aggregate investment.
Our paper argues that this view is incomplete, if not incorrect. Indeed, there may be
little relationship between share prices and investment. We discussed earlier (and show
more rigorously below) that temporary dividend tax reductions can be associated with an
increase in share prices but a lowering of investment. When rms anticipate a dividend
tax increase, they have an incentive to pay out higher dividends under the current low
tax regime. If they are already cash constrained in equilibrium, then inducing them to
decrease their cash holdings even further because of intertemporal tax arbitrage decreases
aggregate investment and reduces welfare.
Some of the proponents of the dividend tax cut, by contrast, have argued that the net
marginal return to investment in certain rms with large cash holdings is actually negative,
i.e. that they engage in socially wasteful investments.8 If such rms are encouraged to pay
dividends is immaterial: just as tax policies are never \permanent," so are rms' payout policies: for
signaling or intertemporal smoothing reasons (which we do not incorporate into our model { doing so
would not alter the qualitative results but would add greatly to the complexity of the analysis), rms
might prefer to gradually lower their cash balances for the duration of the low dividend tax rate by raising
regular dividends. Also, they might rationally anticipate that a future tax increase could allow them to
cut regular dividends with only small adverse signaling eects.
7For a rm such as Microsoft, for example, where large stakes are held by in
uential insiders, agency
problems might be less severe, implying a relatively low discount rate, and potential investment opportu-
nities, including takeovers, might be large due to the fast-changing nature of its industry. (An acquisition
through a cash purchase would in fact provide an avenue for distributing funds from the corporate sector
to the household sector subject to the more favorable capital gains treatment.) This can explain both the
large cash holdings of the rm and the strong response to the tax arbitrage opportunity presented in 2003,
which took the form of a $32bn special dividend. Furthermore, the recent Microsoft oer for Yahoo is
consistent with the presence of large investment opportunities.
8Jensen (1986), for example, emphasized the potential agency costs of free cash 
ow. Gordon and Dietz
(2006) and Chetty and Saez (2007) build these considerations into their models of dividend taxation.
6out dividends, economic eciency could be increased for two potential reasons: rst, cash-
abundant rms would no longer engage in as much wasteful investment; secondly, their
cash distributions could get reshued to cash-constrained rms with a higher marginal
product of capital.
First, the view that there was over-investment and that it would have been a good thing
for investment to be reduced in some rms runs at least counter to the professed argument
for the 2003 temporary dividend tax cut, which was introduced to stimulate the economy
in the belief that aggregate investment was too low at the time. There may have been some
rms, where agency problems were so severe that managers made inecient investments at
the margin9 and for which a temporary reduction in dividend taxes that reduced investment
may have been welfare increasing. However, at least the average product of capital inside
rms seems to be signicantly larger than the risk-free rate.10 This casts doubt on the
claim that a large number of rms exhibit a negative marginal product of investment. If
shareholders believe that the marginal returns to keeping funds inside the rm are less
than their (outside) opportunity costs, they can and presumably would demand larger
cash distributions (either in the form of dividends or share repurchases).11
Secondly, for the tax cuts to raise the eciency of the capital allocation in the economy,
payouts must be reinvested in new investment projects. However, it is generally much easier
for government policies to get money out of the corporate sector than to put it back in.
An important factor that inhibits this `recycling of capital' is asymmetric information (see
e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Greewald et al., 1984). Another factor can be international
capital 
ows that break the link between domestic saving and investment (see e.g. Slemrod,
1988) and that have become a major force in driving US interest rates in recent years.
Chetty and Saez (2007) argue that the increases in dividend payments that could be
observed after the 2003 tax cut stem from a shift from wasteful towards productive in-
vestments, implying large welfare gains from the dividend tax cuts. As our paper shows,
there may be other explanations for increases in dividend payments { with opposite welfare
impacts, especially in the context of temporary tax changes.12
9This assumes that take-over mechanisms do not work well { for reasons suggested by e.g. Stiglitz
(1972), Grossman and Hart (1980) and Edlin and Stiglitz (1995).
10This is e.g. one of the ndings of the literature on the equity premium puzzle, which asserts that the
large part of the equity premium cannot be satisfactorily explained by risk aversion (Mehra and Prescott,
1985; Kocherlakota, 1996).
11Indeed, a standard response to \excess cash holdings" by rms and the associated agency problems
is what Hall (1988) termed the \backs-to-the-wall" approach of corporate nance: shareholders demand
large pay-outs from managers, leaving rms equity-constrained, as we model in this paper. This not only
removes the scope for excess investment, but the increased probability of bankruptcy to which it gives rise
enhances managerial incentives (see Greenwald and Stiglitz, 2003). Theories of excess corporate liquidity
presume not only that shareholders cannot control managerial misbehavior, but also that they cannot
eectively control dividend distributions to mitigate such behavior.
12Our analysis focuses on intertemporal arbitrage, but there are other possible eects, e.g. related to
substitutions from share repurchases, or cyclical factors such as a temporary rise in rm prots or a
reduction in investment opportunities. If the eects identied by Chetty and Saez were dominant, one
would expect to see a lowering of investment in mature rms and a corresponding increase in investment
in rms that were formerly equity constrained. In fact, comparing investment in the late 1990s with post-
2003 suggests the opposite; the major increase in investment occurred in real estate { in what appeared
at the time to be a response to a real estate bubble. Though there may be other factors accounting for
7There are several other dimensions of heterogeneity that may determine a rm's re-
sponses to dividend taxes. If markets are rational, a temporary dividend tax cut will aect
only rms that are expected to pay dividends while the low tax rate is in eect. However,
among the more dynamic sectors of the economy are the `new economy' sectors, where
any payouts are largely in forms that are subjected to capital gains taxation.13 Capital
market imperfections (such as the absence of good risk markets, etc.) mean that there
may be underinvestment in this part of the economy, relative to the `old' and mature div-
idend paying rms. This is true without agency problems, but even more so with agency
problems. Lowering dividend taxes advantages the old economy, as opposed to rms in the
new economy, and thus may exacerbate the ineciency of capital allocation.14
Those rms that pay out dividends and whose share prices should therefore benet
from temporary dividend tax cuts are mostly mature rms that do not issue equity and
have little to gain from a lower cost of equity. Share prices and the cost of equity for new
rms that do issue equity should be hardly aected by a temporary tax cut, since they are
unlikely to pay dividends while the low tax rate is in eect.15
Our analysis does not take into account the budget decits/revenue shortfalls created
by the dividend tax cut. In the absence of lump-sum taxation, any replacement taxes that
make up for the lost revenue will introduce further distortions. If taxes are not raised, a
higher stock of public debt may increase interest rates at the margin and thereby discourage
investment. (It is a more complicated matter to assess whether, at the margin, welfare
is increased by lowering dividend/capital taxation. That depends on the deviation of the
current tax structure from the \optimal"16 tax structure.)17
these investment patterns, there is little support for the view that the higher dividend payout led to overall
productive gains.
13These `smart' sectors are not only smart in innovation; they have also gured out the dividend puzzle.
14This provides support for one of the political criticisms of the temporary dividend tax cuts, that they
benetted the interests of old and stagnant industries rather than those of young and dynamic industries.
It is perhaps no accident that the Secretaries of Treasury in oce at the time of both tax cuts had been
CEO's of \old economy" rms; and that the sway of \new economy" rms was markedly lower in the Bush
Administration than in the Clinton Administration.
15Empirically, there is a controversy regarding the impact of the tax cut on the share prices of non-
dividend paying rms: Auerbach and Hassett (2006, 2007) nd that the share prices of rms that are
likely to issue new equity increased signicantly as a result of the tax cut; Amromin et al. (2006) argue
that the same eect can be found for REITs and European stocks that are not aected by US dividend
tax policy and should therefore be attributed to other market factors. As we show in this paper, some of
the ambiguity might be due to the fact that in 2003, investors assigned a positive probability to a more
permanent extension of the temporary tax cuts.
16Whether, and to what extent, capital should be taxed is a complicated and contentious issue (see for
instance Stiglitz, 1998).
17In the theoretical literature, Gourio and Miao (2007) perform a similar analysis, though mostly for
the case of mature rms. As in Sinn (1991), rms in their model engage in intertemporal tax arbitrage by
adjusting the physical capital stock, which is subject to both decreasing returns to scale and adjustment
costs. By contrast, this paper explicitly allows rms to accumulate cash holdings, which better accounts
for the behavior of rms that experience tax arbitrage opportunities (a clear example being Microsoft).
For a detailed empirical analysis of rms' saving behavior as a response to both uncertainty and imperfect
access to external capital markets see e.g. Riddick and Whited (2007). Furthermore, we aggregate over
rms of all three stages of development so as to analyze the behavior of macroeconomic variables.
8In section 2 we develop our basic life-cycle model of capital constrained rms with ran-
dom investment opportunities that are subject to dividend taxation. Section 3 investigates
the eects of unanticipated and anticipated dividend tax changes on rm behavior. Sec-
tion 4 analyzes how dividend tax policy aects macroeconomic variables such as aggregate
investment. Section 5 brie
y discusses a simple model of the political economy of dividend
taxation. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
Underlying the model developed here are two key economic considerations:
First, it is costly for rms to hold cash. Cash holdings within rms are discounted at a
higher rate than cash holdings outside, because of agency concerns (including managerial
myopia) and because of imperfections in risk markets, which may result in households
being even more credit rationed than rms. Analytically, we assume that the discount
factor  on rms' future distributions is lower than the risk-free discount factor 1
1+r, where
r is the risk-free interest rate.18
Secondly, because of capital market imperfections, rms cannot instantaneously raise
new capital for investment purposes { they have to rely on their working capital. In our
model, these constraints become particularly important because we assume that investment
opportunities arrive at random.19 If rms do not have cash on hand, these investment
opportunities have to be forgone.
As a result, rms have an incentive to hold working capital { to give them the resources
to take advantage of new opportunities as they arrive { even though the rate of interest
that they earn on cash is lower than the discount rate they face.
Our model allows us to analyze precisely these intertemporal trade-os. Suppose that
the amount of cash a rm has on hand at the beginning of period t is Mt. The rm decides
how much to pay in dividends Dt and keeps its remaining cash holdings Mt   Dt on the
balance sheet.
To capture the random arrival of investment opportunities, we assume that a Bernoulli
variable ~ t indicates every period whether a rm has an investment project. ~ t takes on
the value of 1 with probability p, which indicates that the rm can invest, and 0 with
probability (1   p). If a rm has a project, then investing It dollars yields a pay-o of
F(It) at the end of period t, with F() being a neoclassical production function, e.g. of
the form F(It) = AI
t . For notational convenience we also dene a corresponding net
production function, or net prots G(It) = F(It)   (1 + r)It.
Re
ecting imperfect capital markets, investment is limited by the amount of cash that
18For simplicity, there is no aggregate market risk in our model; therefore the risk-free rate would be
the appropriate discount rate in the absence of the discussed market imperfection. See appendix A for
a motivation of the discount factor  < 1
1+r from micro fundamentals based on a model of managerial
myopia.
19Theories of asymmetric information, such as Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Myers and Majluf (1984),
have explained why rms may face credit and equity constraints. Our analysis does not depend on the
particular explanation for the constraints, only on the fact that such constraints exist.
9a rm keeps on its balance sheet
It  Mt   Dt (1)
If a rm does not have an investment project, it keeps the amount of Mt  Dt on its bank
account and earns interest at rate r on it.20 And thus
~ Mt+1 = (1 + r)[Mt   Dt] + ~ tG(It) (2)
This is the basic law of motion for cash holdings. Investment is limited to cash on hand as
given in equation (1). We we will show that normally, the constraint is binding, i.e. the full
amount of cash available is invested when an investment opportunity arises. This means
that the key decision variable is Dt. Given the structure of our model, Dt depends simply
on Mt, i.e. it is a function D(Mt). Technically, this section analyzes the optimal dividend
policy of the rm, D(Mt), and, in particular, how it is aected by dividend taxation.
Before proceeding to the analytical part of the paper, let us note that our assumptions
regarding investment opportunities, capital stock, access to capital markets, and incentives
for dividend payments have been made mainly for analytical simplicity. There are the
following four dimensions along which the presented model could be generalized without
signicantly aecting the predictions of the paper:
Firstly, instead of a binary Bernoulli variable determining an investment opportunity,
we could allow for opportunities of dierent magnitudes, e.g. that rms face a production
function of the form ~ tF(It), where ~ t 2 [0;1) is a random variable. Alternatively, we
could allow rms to carry unused opportunities into future periods at some cost. The
assumption that postponing investment is costly corresponds to the real world, since rms
are subject to e.g. changing competition, including competition from abroad, and evolving
consumer tastes. As long as there is at least some cost associated with not fully seizing
an investment opportunity in the period in which it is optimal to do so, then changes in
rms' cash balances induced by changes in dividend taxation can have real eects.21
Secondly, we could easily add a state variable for rms' long-term capital holdings to
our analysis. In the current paper we have focused on holdings of cash rather than long-
term capital since cash or other liquid short-term assets are the most convenient tools for
short-term intertemporal tax arbitrage. This should not be understood as suggesting that
rms' long-term capital holdings are unimportant in other economic questions, but for the
purpose of analyzing intertemporal tax arbitrage it keeps our model more tractable.
Thirdly, the extreme case of having no access to capital markets once an investment
opportunity has materialized could easily be relaxed. We could for example assume that
rms are subject to a maximum debt equity ratio (which they would in equilibrium always
exhaust, since debt is cheaper than equity), and that this is already built into the produc-
tion function F() given above. Alternatively, if rms changed their debt equity ratio in
response to tax changes, the discussed results could be attenuated, but in general they will
20In our model, we assume that the rate of interest is xed, e.g. as would be the case in a small open
economy. As discussed e.g. in Sinn (1991), qualitative results would be similar if the interest adjusted as
rms paid out higher dividends.
21Obviously, the magnitude of the welfare loss is smaller the smaller the diminution in value as a result
of postponement.
10not disappear. Our results hold as long as internal nance and external nance are not or
not always perfect substitutes, e.g. because there are costs to accessing capital markets.
This is certainly true in the real world.22
Fourthly, regarding rms' payout policy, the assumption that future dividend payments
are discounted at a higher rate than the risk-free interest rate can be replaced by any
other theory of why rms make dividend payments without changing the implications of
tax changes for rm investment. The only requirement is that changes in tax rates over
time aect rms' marginal incentive to pay out dividends.23 An example for a theory of
dividend payments other than agency costs is e.g. the accumulated retained earnings tax,
which punishes rms for holdings excessive cash balances. As long as future changes in
tax rates lead rms to alter their payout behavior at the margin, rms' cash balances and
thus their investment and output will be aected.
Our model is compatible with share repurchases as long as there is at least some role
left to dividends, e.g. if share repurchases are capped because of IRS rules that would
subject excessive repurchases to dividend taxation.
We begin our formal analysis by looking at rms' payout policy under a constant
dividend tax rate. Following the arguments of Stiglitz (1973, 1976) and Sinn (1991), we
show that the behavior of rms can be analyzed by looking at three stages: (a) new
rms that access equity markets; (b) young rms: there exists a threshold M such that
for Mt  M, rms retain all their earnings and Dt = 0; and (c) mature rms, which
distribute all excess cash beyond M, i.e. Dt = Mt  M. The amount M can be derived
as the optimal amount of cash balances that rms hold for investment purposes in steady
state.
2.1 Model Setup
Managers maximize the stock market value of the representative rm, i.e. the stream
of dividend payments discounted by the factor  that re
ects the agency problem, and
22Even if we allowed rms to access equity markets again in case a very large investment opportunity
~ t arrives, rms' cost of equity would be 1 +  as opposed to 1    for the cost of retained earnings, so
there would be a real cost involved with being capital constrained.
23Normally, this will be the case, so long as rms are concerned about the present discounted value of
dividends. Our analysis is, in particular, consistent with the signaling theory of dividends, if we allow
that, when tax arbitrage opportunities arise, investors consider special dividends dierently from regular
dividend payments. In particular, rational investors should realize (i) a change in tax rates implies a
change in the optimal holdings of cash; (ii) the most tax ecient way of distributing the excess is through
a one time share repurchase; (iii) a reduction of distributions from that level should not be viewed as a
negative signal { and indeed, a rm that fails to distribute its excess cash holdings in a tax ecient way
is signaling its incompetency.
11diminished by the dividend tax rate :








t (1   )Dt
)
(3)
s.t. Mt+1 = (1 + r)[Mt   Dt] + ~ tG(It) (4)
Mt  It + Dt (5)
Dt  0 (6)
with M0 > 0 given.
Constraint (4) describes the law of motion for cash holdings; constraint (5) captures the
fact that dividend payments plus investment cannot exceed the rm's cash holdings. (6)
is the dividend non-negativity constraint.24
Substituting the law of motion for cash holdings (4) we can re-write the maximization
problem (3) in recursive form:
V (Mt) = max
Dt;It
(1   )Dt + EV
n
(1 + r)[Mt   Dt] + ~ tG(It)
o
s.t. (5), (6) (7)
The rm chooses every period how much to pay out in dividends Dt (which simultane-
ously determines the amount of cash left on its balance sheet) and how much to invest in
case an investment opportunity arises. In the following, let us brie
y sketch the solution
strategy to problem (7).25
Lemma 1 Under constant dividend taxes, a rm always invests its entire cash holdings
when an investment opportunity arises. Therefore constraint (5) on the maximum amount
of investment is always binding: It = Mt   Dt.
The intuition for this result is that holding cash is costly and the only purpose of cash is
to be invested; therefore the rm would never hold more than what would be used if an
investment opportunity arises.
Proposition 1 (Steady state cash holdings) In steady state, the rm retains an equi-
librium level of cash balances M, which is dened by
 [pF
0(M
) + (1   p)(1 + r)] = 1 (8)
The term in square brackets represents the expected gross return of cash; it consists
of two parts, the return if an investment opportunity arises (with probability p) and the
return if cash is kept in T-bills (with probability 1   p). Equilibrium is reached when the
24This constraint is needed since rms could otherwise issue new equity through negative dividend
payments at a cost of only (1 )Dt, i.e. with a government subsidy of Dt. This clearly needs to be ruled
out. We discuss the dynamics of raising equity below.
25A more detailed analytical derivation of the Lagrangian problem corresponding to (7) and of the
following lemmas and propositions is available from the authors upon request.



























Figure 1: The value function V (Mt) can be determined iteratively from rms' maximization
problem (7). Parameter values:  = 1=2,  = 0:93, r = 0:01, p = 1=2,  = 38:6%, A calibrated
so that M = 1.
expected return discounted by  is unity.26 If It < M, then rm value could be increased
by increasing cash holdings; if It > M, then value is being destroyed and it would be
optimal to reduce the rm's cash holdings.
The equilibrium condition above implies that F 0(M) < 1 + r, i.e. rm investment is
always constrained in steady state { agency concerns lead rms to pay out cash because of
managerial myopia or because this reduces the amount of `free cash' that managers might
abuse.Inducing rms to reduce cash holdings further, e.g. because of intertemporal tax
arbitrage, entails a rst-order cost.
It is noteworthy that condition (8) is independent of the level of dividend taxes { the
behavior of mature rms is unaected by dividend taxation. Pre-multiplying both sides of
the equation by (1   ), the left side of (8) can be interpreted as the marginal payo to
investors of keeping one dollar of cash in the rm and the right hand side as the marginal
payo of paying out one dollar in dividends, i.e. 1   . For rms in steady state, the two
sides have to equal.
Proposition 2 (Payout policy) A rm retains all of its earnings and pays no dividends
as long as its cash holdings are below the steady state level, i.e. Mt < M. It pays out
dividends if its cash holdings are in excess of M:
Dt = maxfMt   M
;0g
This result follows directly from lemma 1. A rm would never keep more cash than it
would invest since holding excess cash is costly.
26The corresponding equilibrium condition in standard models of physical capital is 1
1+rE[f0(K)] = 1;
the optimal capital stock is at the point where the cost of capital equals the marginal return on physical
capital. We focus on cash holdings here, which can be more easily adjusted when tax rates change and
rms want to engage in intertemporal tax arbitrage.
13Proposition 3 (Value function) The rm's value function is strictly concave and in-
creases at a rate V 0(Mt) > 1    for growing rms with Mt < M. It is linear with slope
V 0(Mt) = 1    for mature rms with Mt  M.
Beyond M, the value function is linear since any excess cash holdings Mt   M are
immediately paid out and taxed at rate . Below M, the value function inherits its
concavity from the production function: the lower investment, the higher the marginal
product and therefore the higher the increase in the value of the rm from raising its cash
holdings. The value function does not have an explicit algebraic representation, but gure
1 shows an example for typical parameter values.
Let us next dene V (Mt;) as the value of a rm with cash holdings Mt, given the tax
rate  as an argument. We can then nd that dividend taxation simply scales the value of
an untaxed rm by the factor 1   :
Proposition 4 (Eect of dividend taxes on rm value) The value of a rm with cash
holdings Mt under a constant dividend tax rate of  can be expressed as V (Mt;) =
(1   )V (Mt;0), where V (Mt;0) is the value function under zero dividend taxation.
2.2 Raising Equity
Let us next analyze the behavior of new rms that raise equity. Suppose that an en-
trepreneur develops a new business idea and starts a rm that needs an initial injection of
equity. We also allow for the case that issuing new equity is costly. For every dollar that
the rm receives in funding, the investor has to pay an additional premium of   0 in
transactions costs. This can include e.g. underwriting fees (see Chen and Ritter, 2000) as
well as underpricing because of agency problems (see e.g. Asquith and Mullins, 1986). The
optimum amount of new equity N that the rm raises is then determined by the following
no-arbitrage consideration:
Proposition 5 (Equity issuance) (i) For a new rm the optimal amount of equity N()
to raise satises the condition V 0 (N();) = 1+. (ii) N() is decreasing in the dividend
tax rate  and in the cost of raising equity .
In the graph in gure 2, we have indicated the points where the slope of the value function
reaches 1 +  and where it reaches 1, the latter being the case without transactions costs,
which enables the entrepreneur to raise a higher amount of cash.
In short, the life-cycle of a rm in our model can be split into three distinct regions:
External nancing region: For Mt < N() the rm's marginal value of cash is higher
than its external nancing costs 1+. The rm thus raises cash from equity markets
up to the point N().27
27In our analysis, rms only issue equity once. In practice, young rms often issue equity in several
tranches because of asymmetries of information: insiders may know (or believe) that information will
become available that will reveal that the true value of the company is higher than currently believed;
current owners thus want to minimize the dilution required by postponing raising funds from the market.
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Figure 2: New equity issues: For a new rm, it is optimal to raise equity N up to the point
where V 0(N;) = 1 + , or 1 if there are no costs to issuing equity. Parameter values used:
 = 25%,  = 36:8%.
Internal growth region: For Mt 2 [N();M) the rm's marginal value of funds is too
low to raise new equity, but too high to pay out dividends. In this region, the rm
grows internally by investing and retaining its earnings until it reaches the steady
state with Mt = M. Also, the rm does not pay dividends in the internal growth
region.
Steady state: For Mt  M the rm is in its steady state. Every period, it pays out
its cash holdings in excess of the optimal holdings M in the form of dividends. If
an investment opportunity arises, then the rm invests M and earns F(M). Next
period the rm distributes all but the amount of cash required for new investments,
i.e. it pays a dividend Dt+1 = F(M) M. Otherwise, if no investment opportunity
arises, it earns interest of rM, which it pays out at the beginning of the next period.28
As a consequence, note that once the rm has reached the threshold M, its cash
holdings will never again fall below this value, given constant parameters values.
Since the arrival of investment opportunities is random, the path along this life-cycle
will dier from rm to rm. However, to give an example we have depicted the average
cash balances of a new rm over its rst 15 periods in gure 3. As can be seen, almost all
Sometimes rms return to equity markets at later stages in their development. This can be modeled as a
simple extension of the model presented here when rms face a positive (publicly observable) shift in their
production function. If that shift is large enough, it may pay the rm to raise new equity in the market
(in spite of the high cost of doing so), because the opportunities forgone otherwise would simply be too
great. However, even without asymmetries of information, even if the shift in the production function
were perfectly anticipated, and even if there were xed costs to entering the equity market, rms might
not want to raise all of their equity at one time, because of agency costs.
28This yields the result that dividends are variable. In practice, dividends often show a high degree
of stability related to their signaling role, as discussed e.g. in Ross (1977) or Bhattacharya (1979) and
evidenced in DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990). Note that in this model, dividends perform no signaling
role. Including a coherent model in which dividends might perform such a role would greatly complicate
the analysis, e.g. by requiring random shifts in the production function of the rm.































Figure 3: Average Evolution of Firm: The gure shows how investment, production, and
dividend payments for a new rm evolve on average over the rst 15 periods. In the rst
period, the rm raises N() where we chose  = 38:6%. It invests on average pN and
produces pF(N). In the 15th period, its expected investment and production are almost
indistinguishable from the steady state values pM and pF(M).
new rms in our example have reached the mature stage with Mt = M after 10 periods
under our choice of parameters.
3 Changes in the Dividend Tax Rate
The model developed in the previous section now allows us to analyze how capital con-
strained rms react to changes in the dividend tax rate. As we discussed before, unantic-
ipated tax changes are likely to have only a small impact on aggregate investment, since
they aect only young rms issuing equity. On the other hand, in the case of anticipated
tax changes, rms engage in tax arbitrage, which aects their optimal level of cash balances
and hence has potentially strong implications for aggregate investment.
3.1 Unanticipated Dividend Tax Changes
Unanticipated cuts and increases in the dividend tax rate aect the value function of rms
in a similar fashion:
Proposition 6 An unanticipated permanent dividend tax cut (increase) from 1 to 2
scales rms' value function V (Mt;1) proportionally upwards (downwards) to V (Mt;2).
The optimal investment and payout policy of mature rms is not aected by an unantici-
pated change in dividend taxation.
These results are easy to see from the fact that dividend taxes do not aect the max-




















For the investment decisions of mature rms a change in the dividend tax rate in either
direction is neutral. This is typical for models that follow the `new view' of dividend
16taxation. However, the amount of equity that new rms raise is aected by permanent
dividend tax changes, which re
ect the `traditional view' elements of our model.
Proposition 7 An unanticipated permanent cut (increase) in dividend taxes from 1 to
2 increases (decreases) the amount of funds that new rms raise in equity markets from
N(1) to N(2).
As already noted in proposition (5), the amount of equity that new rms raise is
decreasing in the dividend tax rate. In addition, in the case of a tax cut, there might be
some young rms for which cash holdings Mt < N(2), i.e. for which one marginal dollar
of new equity raises rm value by more than the cost of issuing equity (V 0(Mt;2) > 1+).
These rms issue new equity up to the point where Mt = N(2). No similar eect occurs
in the case of unanticipated tax increases. This asymmetry re
ects the asymmetry between
lowering and raising equity (distributing funds to shareholders is subject to the dividend
tax, raising equity is not).29
3.2 Anticipated Dividend Tax Increase
These results contrast strongly with the case of anticipated changes in dividend taxes. Let
us rst analyze the eect of such a policy on young rms issuing equity; then on growing and
mature rms. Throughout the discussion, we denote by Vs(Mt;L;H) the value function
of a rm that expects a dividend tax increase after s periods, i.e. that is subject to a low
dividend tax rate L for s periods and then to a higher rate H for all following periods.
Similarly, we denote by M
s(L;H) the rm's optimal cash balances s periods before the
tax increase. (Note that V0(Mt;L;H)  V (Mt;H) and M
0(L;H) = M.)
For young rms, the cost of equity rises immediately in anticipation of a dividend tax
increase, because investors are forward-looking and expect that much of the payo of their
equity investment will occur in the future when dividend taxes are increased. In the period
directly before the tax increase, new rms raise the same (low) amount of new equity as
if the higher tax rate was already in eect, i.e. N
1(L;H) = N(H). This is because all
dividends that will be paid out by these rms will be subject to the high tax.
To see what happens to new equity issuance in earlier periods, we need to analyze the
value functions of rms in those periods. If a dividend tax hike is anticipated for time t,
then rms' value function in period t   s can be denoted iteratively as







for any s > 0, where V0(Mt;L;H) = V (Mt;H), as discussed above.
We have depicted the value functions V1 to V15 for the 15 periods preceding an antic-
ipated dividend tax hike in gure 4. The upmost value function in the gure represents
rms that are permanently subject to the old (low) tax rate L; the lowest curve represents
rms that are subject to the new (high) tax rate H forever. If an increase in the dividend
29The marginal value of dividends to shareholders is 1   ; the marginal cost to issuing equity is 1 + .
Both the dividend tax and the cost involved in issuing equity thus increase the wedge between the cost of
new equity and the cost of capital in the form of retained earnings.













































Figure 4: Anticipated Dividend Tax Increase, Value Functions: This gure shows the value
functions fV15;:::;V1g of rms in the 15 periods prior to an anticipated dividend tax increase
from L = 0% to H = 38:6%. When the future tax increase is announced, the value function
jumps immediately from the top curve V (Mt;L) down to V15. Firms' value functions then
move in small steps period-by-period closer to V (Mt;H).
tax rate is announced s periods ahead, this implies that rms' value function immediately
jumps from the upmost curve down to Vs(L;H). As can be seen in the gure, the series
of value functions Vk(L;H), k = s;s   1;:::;1 moves every period a little closer to the
nal value function V (Mt;H), which will come into eect under the new dividend tax
rate. The amount of equity N
s(L;H) that new rms would issue in a given year t   s is
depicted as the tangent with slope 1+ to the value function Vs(). Analytically it can be
determined by the condition V 0
s(N
s();L;H) = 1 + . Clearly, N
s() decreases the closer
the economy comes to the dividend tax increase. Let us summarize this in the following:
Proposition 8 When a dividend tax increase from L to H is anticipated in s > 1 periods,
new rms issue an amount of equity N
s(L;H), which lies in between N(L) and N(H)
and falls the closer the increase, i.e. N
s > N
s 1. In the period immediately preceding the
tax hike, rms issue the same (low) amount of equity N(H) as if the high tax rate was
already in eect.
The eects of an anticipated tax increase on new rms thus follow what is predicted
by the traditional view of dividend taxation, since the marginal source of funds for new
rms is equity markets. For this category of rms, our ndings are also consistent with
Alvarez et al. (1998) who discuss how rm investment reacts to the anticipation of tax
policy changes.
An important implication of this nding is that a temporary tax cut that is scheduled
to expire after a few periods does not raise the amount of investment by much and has a
signicantly smaller impact on the cost of equity of new rms than what would be predicted
from analyzing a permanent tax cut of identical magnitude.
Let us next turn our attention to rms that no longer access equity markets, i.e. inter-
nally growing and mature rms. These are the rms that have an incentive to engage in
18tax arbitrage: shareholders can save taxes if rms pay out a higher amount of dividends
in the period preceding a tax increase. However, this tax arbitrage is limited by the fact
that rms need cash in order to take advantage of random investment opportunity. The
optimal amount of cash balances M
1(L;H) balances these two factors o against each
other.
Proposition 9 An anticipated increase in dividend taxes from L to H induces rms
with cash holdings Mt 1 > M
1(L;H) to pay out a special dividend in the period t   1
immediately prior to the tax increase. They reduce their cash holdings to M
1(L;H) < M,




1;H) = 1   L
This depresses investment and lowers dividends in the period t of the tax increase and in
the following periods, until rms have restored their optimal level of cash balances M
through internal savings.
Under a constant dividend tax rate L, steady-state cash holdings are dened by the
condition V 0(M;L) = 1   L, i.e. the marginal value of keeping one dollar inside the
rm is the after-tax value of a one dollar dividend. The period before a tax increase, this
intertemporal tradeo changes: keeping one dollar inside the rm will raise rm value
in the future only by V 0(Mt;H) < V 0(Mt;L) since the tax rate is expected to go up,
while current dividends still yield the after-tax value 1   L. Firms thus pay out a special
dividend up to the point M
1(L;H) < M where marginal benet and cost of keeping cash
are equalized. In gure 5, this is the point where the slope of the high-tax value function
V 0(Mt;H) = 1   L, which is indicated by the vertical line labeled M
1(L;H). Beyond
this M
1, rms' value function V1(Mt 1;L;H) is linear and increasing at rate 1 L, since
all cash in excess is paid out and taxed at the rate L.
Note that in earlier periods before the tax cut, i.e. t   2, t   3 etc., internally growing
and mature rms do not alter their behavior in response to an impending dividend tax
increase: they accumulate cash balances up to M and pay out any excess, because there
aren't any tax arbitrage opportunities yet. However, rm value still falls in anticipation of
the higher tax rate (see again the value functions in gure 4).
3.3 Probabilistic Dividend Tax Increase
Firms react in a similar way if there is uncertainty about whether a dividend tax increase
will occur in a future period. Such a situation can arise for example if a dividend tax cut
has been implemented in the past and rms expect (e.g. for political economy reasons or
because of large scal decits) that the tax cut will be undone in a future period.
Proposition 10 Suppose that in every time period, there is a probability  that the pre-
vailing dividend tax rate L will rise to H. Then mature rms reduce their cash balances
to M
(L;H) < M while the low tax rate is in eect.





















































Figure 5: Anticipated Dividend Tax Increase, 1 Period Ahead: In the period preceding a
dividend tax increase from L = 0% to H = 38:6%, rms pay out all their cash holdings above
M
1(L;H) in the form of a special dividend. Their value function V1(Mt;L;H) coincides
with the new value function VH up to that point and increases at the constant slope 1   L
(steeper than the new value function) thereafter.
M
 is the point at which the expected stochastic tax savings from paying out a higher
dividend now (left-hand side) equal the cost of forgoing a potential investment opportunity
next period because of cash constraints (right-hand side):
1   L = V
0(M

;H) + (1   )(1   L)[pF
0 (M

) + (1   p)(1 + r)]
Naturally, mature rms depress their cash balances more the greater the probability of the
tax increase and the larger the expected dierence in tax rates. For young rms raising
cash, the implications are similar to what we discussed in the previous subsection. A direct
implication of the observation that M
(L;H) < M is the following:
Corollary 1 If there is uncertainty about a future dividend tax increase, investment by
mature rms can be increased by raising dividend taxes immediately.
What is perhaps even more striking is that whether the government raises or leaves the tax
rate (permanently) unchanged, rm investment and tax revenues will increase. Once the
uncertainty about a possible dividend tax increase is resolved (in either direction), mature
rms increase their cash holdings back to M.
3.4 Anticipated Dividend Tax Cut
We next investigate a dividend tax cut from H to L that is anticipated in s periods. The
general idea is that for new rms, the cost of capital falls in anticipation of the tax cut; for
mature rms the anticipated tax cut enables rms to engage in intertemporal tax arbitrage
by postponing dividend payments. Let us focus on each category of rms in some detail.
Similar to our discussion in subsection 3.2, investors expect that much of the dividend
payments of new rms will occur after the tax cut; therefore rms' valuation rises imme-
diately, as depicted in gure 6 for the 15 periods preceding an anticipated tax cut. The











































Figure 6: Anticipated Dividend Tax Cut, Value Functions: The value functions fV15;:::;V1g
of rms in the 15 periods prior to an anticipated dividend tax cut move closer and closer to the
value function V (Mt;L) prevailing under the new dividend tax rate. The amount of equity
that new rms issue, indicated by the tangent with slope 1 +  to each value function, rises.
bottom line depicts rms' value function under the old high-tax regime; the top line rep-
resents the value function after the tax cut was enacted. The curves in between illustrate
how rms' valuation gradually approaches the after-tax cut valuation.
The tangents with slope 1 +  to the various value functions V15;V14; etc. (marked
with a vertical tick) indicate the amounts of new equity that young rms issue in the
respective periods. In the periods immediately preceding a tax cut, rms issue the same
amount of equity N
1(H;L) = N(L) as if the cut was already enacted, since all their
future dividends will be taxed at the lower rate. In earlier periods, the optimal amount
of new equity continually rises, i.e. N
s 1 > N
s. Young rms with low cash holdings
Mt s < N
s(H;L) thus have an incentive to access equity markets again, and possibly
multiple times, since their internal cost of capital is higher than the new cost of equity,
given the impending dividend tax cut.30
Mature and internally growing rms can delay dividend payments to later periods and
thereby save on dividend taxes by temporarily increasing their cash holdings above M.
The extent to which they are willing to do so depends on the magnitude of the expected
tax cut.
Proposition 11 Let k be the largest integer such that 1 H < (1 L)[(1+r)]k. Then
mature rms keep all their cash earnings on the balance sheet for the k periods preceding a
tax cut, i.e. Ms = 1 for s = 1;:::;k. In period k + 1 before the tax cut, rms accumulate
cash balances up to M














30This is an important asymmetry to anticipated tax increases as discussed in subsection 3.2, where
rms could not undo equity issues when the cost of equity rose in reaction to an anticipated tax increase.
21Firms pay out all their cash holdings in excess of M as a special dividend after the tax
cut has been implemented.
For the rst k periods, paying dividends in the future at the lower tax rate is { despite
the high discount rate { more favorable to investors than paying out immediately under the
high tax rate, and therefore rms pay zero dividends and retain all earnings.31 We noted
earlier that, because of agency considerations, rms' equilibrium cash holdings M and
by implication rms' investment are below the optimum investment I in a neoclassical
world without capital constraints (dened by F 0(I) = 1 + r). Postponing dividends
raises rm cash holdings and enables rms to more fully take advantage of investment
opportunities. Specically, arbitraging rms invest all their cash holdings up to I > M
when an investment opportunity arrives and keep the rest in cash, i.e. they are subject to
constant returns to scale above I, earning the risk-free return r.
In period k + 1 before the tax cut, optimal cash holdings are M < M
k+1 < I { rms
increase cash holdings above the long-run steady state, but are still cash-constrained in
equilibrium because the incentives for tax arbitrage are only weak. They pay out any cash
earnings in excess of M
k+1. After that, no further dividend payment is made until after
the tax cut, when all the accumulated excess cash holdings Mt   M are distributed to
shareholders in the form of a special dividend.
If a dividend tax cut is expected to occur in more than k +1 periods in the future, the
payout and investment policies of existing rms are unaltered. However, share prices rise
immediately in anticipation of the tax cut.
In summary, an anticipated dividend tax cut leads to a permanent increase in invest-
ment by new rms and a temporary increase in investment by internally growing and
mature rms engaging in tax arbitrage.
3.5 Probabilistic Dividend Tax Cut
If there is uncertainty about whether a dividend tax cut will occur in a future period,
similar conclusions hold. An example for this situation occurred in 2002, when political
parties were discussing the possibility of a reduction in the dividend tax rate.
Proposition 12 If rms expect a dividend tax cut from H to L with a probability of  in
every time period until the tax cut is realized, they accumulate cash balances up to a level
of M
(H;L) > M while the higher tax rate is in eect, which is dened by
(1   Et+1)[pF 0(M
) + (1   p)(1 + r)] = 1   H if 1   H > (1 + r)(1   Et+1)
M
 = 1 if 1   H  (1 + r)(1   Et+1)
where Et+1 = (1   )H + L is the expected dividend tax rate next period.
In other words, rms reduce their dividend payments and increase their cash holdings in
order to take advantage of the expected lower dividend tax in the future. If the tax cut
is likely or large enough, as described by the second inequality, rms will not pay any
31For dividend tax cuts that are small in comparison to the equity premium, it is possible that k = 0.
22dividends until the tax cut has materialized. Instead, they would be willing to accumulate
arbitrarily large cash balances.
Corollary 2 If there is uncertainty about whether there will be a tax decrease, it pays
the government to postpone resolving that uncertainty (either way). In the interim, tax
revenues are higher and output is higher.
3.6 Temporary Dividend Tax Changes
Essentially, an unanticipated temporary change in dividend taxes is equivalent to an unan-
ticipated change in one direction followed by an anticipated change in the reverse direction
at a later point in time.
Let us rst focus on temporary dividend tax cuts. Assume that a high dividend tax
rate of H is unexpectedly reduced to L for k periods, after which it returns to H. As
discussed before, the unanticipated reduction in the tax rate increases the value of all rms.
For new rms, this increases the amount of equity that they raise, but it does not have
any eects on the behavior of mature rms.
However, note that both the increase in stock prices and in the amount of equity that
new rms issue is strongly mitigated by the fact that a dividend tax rise after k periods is
anticipated. Figure 4 reveals that rms' value functions for the periods preceding a typical
tax hike are actually much closer to V (Mt;H), i.e. the lowest line in the gure, than to
V (Mt;L), the highest line that would correspond to a permanent tax cut. In other words,
the positive eects of lower dividend taxes in terms of a lower cost of equity is strongly
reduced by the fact that a dividend tax hike in a future period is impending. The reason is
that young rms usually do not pay out dividends in the rst few years of their existence,
but only once they have accumulated their steady state holdings of cash M. We can
thus conclude that temporary dividend tax cuts reduce the marginal cost of equity V 0(Mt)
mostly for those rms that do not need it (mature rms), but hardly aect the marginal
cost of equity for new rms that need to access capital markets. In the extreme case of a
one-period temporary tax cut, this leads to the following result.
Proposition 13 The eects of an unanticipated one-period dividend tax cut on aggregate
investment are unambiguously negative.
New rms do not raise more equity than if the tax rate had been kept at H, since taxes
will be back at their earlier level when they make their rst distributions. At the same
time, because of arbitrage considerations, internally growing and mature rms pay out a
special dividend to reduce their cash holdings to M
1(L;H), and their cash balances will
be lower for a number of periods until rms have recovered their optimum, M.
The opposite conclusions hold for a temporary dividend tax increase. While the amount
of equity that new rms issue during the high tax period would fall, rms hold higher cash
balances than M in anticipation of the impending dividend tax cut, and this allows them
to invest higher amounts. Again, the extreme case of an unanticipated one-period increase
would have unambiguously positive eects on aggregate investment, though only for one
period.
234 Aggregate Investment and Output
This section investigates the eects of dividend tax policy on aggregate investment, sum-
ming up across all rms in the economy. For a rm that was started a periods ago, i.e.
of age a, we dene average investment as  Ia := pE[Ia], the probability of receiving an
investment opportunity times the amount that would be invested. Evidently, this entails
that  I0 = pN and  Ia = pM for all a  T, where T is the number of years after which all
rms of vintage a have reached their steady state cash holdings M. Similarly, we dene
expected net output and expected dividend payments by a rm of age a as  Ya := pE [G(Ia)]
and  Da := E[Da].
Assume that at any given time t the economy consists of a mass zt 1 of existing rms,
and a mass zt = 
zt 1 of new rms is started, yielding a total of zt = (1+
)zt 1. Firms
are indexed by i and follow the maximization problem and the resulting rules described in
the previous sections. The arrival of investment opportunities is independent among rms,
yielding deterministic values for all macroeconomic variables.





)a+1. However, the total mass of 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Let us use this setup to simulate the impact of dividend tax policy on aggregate vari-
ables. Note that our analysis is partial equilibrium in the sense that we take the interest
rate as given and do not allow for e.g. osetting monetary policy actions.32 As we argued
earlier, this may be justied if the economy is open to international capital 
ows, which
break the link between domestic saving and investment and determine interest rates ex-
ogenously. In reality, some of the dividends paid out may be re-invested in the domestic
economy. But empirically, there is some question about the extent to which this may be
so.33 Since dividend taxes are only a small part of government revenue, we furthermore
disregard the eects of dividend taxation on the government's budget position.
32Even if there is a feedback eect on interest rates (see e.g. the reasoning in section 3.2. of Sinn, 1991),
all the eects that we discuss are still present, though they are mitigated by endogenous adjustments in
the interest rate.
33For example, if we assume that the Fed sets interest rates so as to maintain a given level of GDP,
then if there are some individuals who are cash constrained ( a la Stiglitz-Weiss), and if these individuals
spend some of the dividends which they receive, then consumption will be higher and investment lower:
in equilibrium, not all of the money will have \re-circulated" back into investment.
Furthermore, dividends may be re-invested in the stock market and drive up the price of shares { but for
mature rms, the marginal source of capital is not equity markets, and therefore the response of investment
24Following Mehra and Prescott (1985, 2003) we chose  = 0:93 and r = 1%. In order
to replicate a typical growth rate of the economy we calibrated 
 = 3%.34 For the other
structural parameters we used values of  = 1=2 and p = 1=2, and A was chosen so that
M = 1. However, our results are robust to alternative calibrations.
4.1 Aggregate Eects of Unanticipated Dividend Tax Changes
We showed in the previous section that the behavior of internally growing and mature rms
(and hence their contribution to investment) is unaected by dividend taxes. However, new
rms issue less equity the higher the dividend tax rate and therefore take longer to reach
the mature stage. This reduces aggregate investment, but since only a small fraction of
investment in the economy is performed by new rms that access equity markets, the
aggregate eect of unanticipated dividend tax changes is small.
We depict an example of an unanticipated reduction of a H = 38:6% dividend tax
to L = 15% in gure 7.35 The tax cut occurs unexpectedly in period 4 and immediately
raises the amount of new equity N that new rms issue. Since the optimal amount of cash
balances M for mature rms remains unchanged, the average rm in the economy has only
slightly higher cash balances, as a result of the higher N. As a result, aggregate investment
AI, production AY , and gross dividend payments AD increase very modestly. However,
the distribution of rms' dividends changes signicantly: shareholders net dividend receipts
(1   )AD increase steeply; the government's revenue from dividend taxation AD falls
sharply. Thus the redistributory eect of changes in dividend taxation is an order of
magnitudes stronger than any eciency eects.36 In our simulation model, the described
cut of a 38:6% dividend tax increased aggregate investment, output, and dividends only by
1.3%, 0.9% and 2% respectively. Recall in this context that due to various tax deductions,
the estimated eective dividend tax rate in the US economy is actually much lower than
the nominal rate.
4.2 Aggregate Eects of an Anticipated Tax Increase
As discussed in the previous section, the results for an anticipated tax change dier sub-
stantially. In gure 8 we have depicted an example of a tax increase from L = 15% to
H = 38:6% that is anticipated to occur in period 8. The eects on aggregate macroe-
conomic variables are twofold: Firstly, new rms issue less and less equity both in the
periods leading up to the increase and under the new tax rate, reducing their investment
to increases in equity prices is limited, slow, and uncertain. Our qualitative results hold as long as the
marginal propensity to invest (directly or indirectly) of the recipients of dividends is lower than had the
money remained inside the rm.
34Empirically, the value of new equity issued 
uctuates wildly from year to year, but 
 = 3% is a
reasonable approximation to the average long-run amount of equity issuance.
35We have normalized all aggregate variables in this gure as well as in the following gures by zt in
order to distinguish the eect of tax policy from the general growth of the economy.
36If the lower government revenue forces a reduction in public spending and if there is a multiplier
associated with government expenditure, then the dividend tax cut would potentially have a strongly
negative eect on output.
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Figure 7: Unanticipated Dividend Tax Cut: After an unanticipated dividend tax cut from
38.6% to 15% in period 4, the amount of new equity N that new rms issue rises signicantly.
However, aggregate investment AI, production AY , and gross dividend payments AD increase
only modestly. The redistributory eect of the tax change, on the other hand, is very strong.
26and prolonging the time for them to reach the steady state. Secondly, all mature rms pay
out a special dividend in the period immediately preceding the tax increase, reducing their
investment for periods to come. Since most rms in the economy are mature, this second
eect is much more pronounced than the rst one. However, as can be seen from the two
graphs at the bottom, the redistributory eects of the tax increase are even stronger than
the direct eects on investment.
Let us also analyze the case of rms that expect a dividend tax increase from L to H
to happen any period with a constant probability of arrival . This encourages internally
growing and mature rms to hold less cash. As a result, aggregate investment is depressed
below the point where it would be if the high tax rate was already in eect { investment will
increase once the dividend tax increase has been enacted, since mature rms will restore
their steady state cash holdings of M.
An example of this is given in gure 9. In the rst three periods of the gure, rms
anticipate that there is a 25% risk of a dividend tax increase in each of the next periods.
This reduces their optimal cash balances to M
. In period 4, the tax increase is enacted,
and rms' optimal level of cash holdings reverts to M > M
, which increases investment
activity in the economy. Note, however, that the amount of equity that new rms issue
decreases in period 4 because of the higher dividend tax rate.
4.3 Aggregate Eects of an Anticipated Tax Cut
An example of rms' reaction to an anticipated dividend tax cut is given in gure 10:
Starting from period 1 agents foresee that dividend taxes will fall from H = 38:6% to
L = 0% in period t = 11. The amount of equity that new rms issue slowly increases
between periods 1 and 11.
Mature rms' payout policy is unchanged up to period 5, in which they reduce their
dividend payments. From period 6 to period 10, rms make no dividend payments and
accumulate an increasing amount of cash on their balance sheets. This allows them to
invest more in case an investment opportunity arises, but only up to a maximum of I,
since the marginal product of capital turns below the risk-free interest rate after this
point. Aggregate investment AI and output AY are thus signicantly above their long-
run equilibrium value.
In period 11, when the tax cut is enacted, mature rms pay a special dividend, which
returns them to the steady state. New rms can now issue a slightly larger amount of
equity, but as the gure illustrates, aggregate investment and output are lower once the
anticipated dividend tax cut has materialized than during the periods when it was expected.
In comparing this example with the case of the unanticipated tax increase of gure 7,
we can see that the eects on all aggregate variables are by an order of a magnitude higher
in the case of anticipated tax changes. This section thus has ve very clear implications
for policymakers:
1. Unanticipated changes in dividend taxes have only insignicant macroeconomic ef-
fects, but strong redistributory consequences.
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Figure 8: Anticipated Dividend Tax Increase: The amount of equity N that new rms
issue starts falling when the tax increase is announced, causing a small decline in aggregate
investment, output, and dividend payments. In the period preceding the tax increase (period 7),
rms pay out a special dividend, reducing aggregate investment AIt, output AYt and dividends
ADt for periods to come. (The dotted line in the graph for investment represents the path
of rms' optimal cash holdings M. It always lies above AI since not all rms are in steady
state.)
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Figure 9: Risk of Dividend Tax Increase: In periods 1 to 3 rms anticipate that there is a
 = 25% risk of a dividend tax hike from 15% to 38.6%. This reduces mature rms' cash
reserves and depresses aggregate investment. The tax increase is enacted in period 4, and
rms' optimal cash reserves (the dotted line in the upper right pane) revert to M. Aggregate
investment increases even though new rms issue less equity N under the higher dividend tax
rate.
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Figure 10: Anticipated Dividend Tax Cut: At k = 5 periods before an anticipated dividend
tax cut from 38.6% to 15%, rms stop paying dividends AD and accumulate cash instead. This
increases the aggregate amounts of investment AI and production AY that rms can engage
in. After the tax cut is enacted, here in period 11, rms pay out all their excess cash and return
to the steady state. The amount of equity that new rms issue, N, increases as a result of the
tax cut, but the overall eect on aggregate investment once the cut has materialized is lower
than in the periods of anticipation.
302. If policymakers want to increase dividend taxes or if rms expect an increase in the
future, it is better to enact it immediately.
3. If policymakers want to reduce dividend taxes or if rms expect a reduction in the
future, back-load the tax cut and keep rms waiting.
4. Unanticipated temporary dividend tax cuts are equivalent to an immediate unantic-
ipated tax cut followed by an anticipated tax increase at a later time; they have an
overall negative eect on investment and output.
5. Conversely, unanticipated temporary dividend tax increases have an overall positive
eect on investment and output.
5 Political Economy of Dividend Tax Changes
In democratic societies, there are frequent changes in party rule, and parties often adjust
the levels of tax rates when they come to power. The eect of any dividend tax policy
thus has to be analyzed in a dynamic context that explicitly takes the possibility of regime
changes and future changes in tax policy into account. This is of even greater importance,
since we have shown in the previous sections that the level of dividend taxation itself does
not have strong macroeconomic eects, but that anticipated changes in the tax rate can
introduce signicant distortions into the economy.
Even if the party in power succeeds in dening a \clear" policy 37, the governing party
cannot, in a democracy, prevent the opposition from suggesting that, should they get
elected, there will be a change in policy. Indeed, contestable politics focuses on changing
policies and this is desirable. It is hard to envision a politics in which each party claims
that it will simply continue with the policies of the opposition.
When a party comes to power, it can set the tax rate according to its preferences, but
it rationally anticipates that it will lose power to a rival within nite time and that its
rival will change the tax rate when it comes to power. Private agents rationally foresee
this and adjust their behavior accordingly; and parties rationally anticipate private agents'
behavior and their rivals' behavior.
Let us assume an economy with two parties that have dierent preferences over tax
rates, e.g. conservatives and social democrats. When conservatives are in power, private
agents anticipate that tax rates will rise as soon as social democrats will come to power.
Under the hypothesis that the switching of parties is governed by a Markovian process,
this is precisely the model that we formulated in section 3.3, where we have shown that
rms pay out higher dividends now and hold lower cash balances. As a result, they are
comparatively constrained in their investment behavior when an investment opportunity
arises. These eects of tax arbitrage are stronger, the larger the expected dividend tax
increase.
37And many have failed to do so { as an extreme example, there were three major tax \reforms" under
Reagan in ve years.
31In our analysis so far, we have taken tax rates as given. But it is easy to derive the
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in the game between two political parties. For each
level of taxation of the social democrats, there is an optimal tax rate for the conservatives:
C = C(S). Because of their dierent preferences, the social democrats impose higher
tax rates than the conservatives. It is easy to see that this fact leads the conservatives
to adjust the optimal tax rate that they impose: The larger the expected tax increase
when conservatives lose power, the more incentive rms have to engage in intertemporal
arbitrage and make large payouts during conservative rule, which make rms relatively
cash constrained and contract their investment and output under the conservative regime.
If conservatives put a high weight on investment and output under their regime, they will
therefore implement a higher tax rate than what would be optimal if they could legislate tax
rates permanently. This raises investment under their regime relative to the opposition's
regime.
When social democrats are in power, on the other hand, investors anticipate a tax cut
the next time that conservatives enter government. As shown in section 3.5, they pay out
lower dividends and accumulate higher cash balances than under conservative rule, which
allows them to invest more when an investment opportunity arises. This eect is stronger
the larger the expected tax cut. Again, we can endogenize social democrats' choice of a
tax rate. For each level of taxation of the conservatives, there is an optimal tax rate for the
social democrats: S = S(C). The social democrats know that (rms know that) when
the conservatives seize power, taxes will be lower. If social democrats also place a large
weight on investment and output in their preferences, they also have an incentive to raise
dividend taxes so as to maximize the expected tax cut. As a result, both parties exhibit a
bias towards \excessive" dividend taxation.38
The Nash equilibrium between the two parties is simply dened as C = C(S(C)),
and it is easy to show that this equilibrium is Pareto inecient. If the discount rate is low
enough, Pareto ecient equilibria can be sustained in a repeated game. We present a more
detailed analysis of this political game as well as a set of more general implications for the
analysis of public policies in contestable democracies in Korinek and Stiglitz (2008).
6 Conclusions
This paper has investigated the dynamic eects of dividend taxation on macroeconomic
variables such as investment and output using a life cycle model of capital constrained
rms. Similar to Sinn (1991), rms in our model start out by issuing equity, then they
accumulate more funds through retaining their earnings, i.e. internal saving, and when
they reach the mature stage, they pay out dividends.
The arguments of the traditional view of dividend taxation apply to rms that are in
the rst stage: since the level of the dividend tax rate aects the valuation of rms, it
38By contrast, if parties place a large weight on dividend payouts under their regime, e.g. because they
value the government revenue derived from dividend taxation or the resulting income stream to investors,
both parties exhibit a bias towards ineciently low tax rates: each party lowers tax rates competitively
so as to induce rms to pay out dividends under its regime.
32has an impact on how much equity new rms issue. On the other hand, the new view of
dividend taxation applies to rms in the second and third stage. Their corporate saving
and investment decisions are not distorted by dividend taxes, so long as the rate is constant,
even though their (after tax) value to shareholders decreases proportional to 1   . Since
only a small fraction of rms in a typical economy are in the rst stage, we have argued
that the level of dividend taxation has only a minor impact on aggregate investment and
output.
We then used the model to investigate the eects of changes in the dividend tax rate
through quantitative simulations. Unanticipated tax changes have a small impact on ag-
gregate investment, since they only aect how much equity new rms issue. However, an-
ticipated dividend tax changes create opportunities for inter-temporal tax arbitrage, and
this can distort rms' cash balances and investment decisions signicantly. An anticipated
dividend tax cut makes mature rms delay their dividend distributions to the period when
the tax rate is reduced, which implies that they have more cash on hand for investment
purposes when an investment opportunity arises. At the same time, anticipated tax cuts
increase the value of rms already in the periods ahead, which raises the amount of equity
that new rms issue. Overall, anticipated tax cuts strongly raise aggregate investment in
the periods prior to the cut.
Similarly, an anticipated dividend tax increase causes mature rms to pay out excessive
dividends, which reduce aggregate investment for a number of periods after the tax hike
until rms have recovered their optimal level of cash holdings. Anticipated tax hikes also
depress the stock price of all rms for several periods before they come into eect, which
reduces the amount of equity that new rms can raise. In total, anticipated increases in
the dividend tax rate reduce aggregate investment before and after the increase comes into
eect.
An unanticipated temporary dividend tax cut, such as the one enacted in the United
States in 2003 and extended in 2006, can be seen as an unanticipated tax cut, followed by
an anticipated tax increase at the expiration of the law.Such a temporary reduction in the
dividend tax rate has a large positive price eect on mature rms, but a negative eect
on their investment, and a small positive price and investment eect on new rms. In the
limiting case of a one period temporary dividend tax cut, the investment eect on mature
rms is negative and that on new rms is zero.
By the same token, uncertainty about whether or how long a government will keep a
low dividend tax rate in place can lead to a phenomenon similar to the peso problem: rms
assign a certain probability to a dividend tax increase, which leads them to pay out more
cash than optimal in every period until the expectations of the tax increase have realized.
In such a situation, it would be optimal to bring the tax increase forward { this would
increase aggregate investment starting in the following period.
Incumbent governments, unfortunately, can only control what they do: they cannot
control what the opposition promises, or what rms and investors believe the opposition
might do. Governments that ignore these dynamic eects do so at their peril.
This paper has explored an important set of dynamic interactions. These are pervasive
in many other arenas of policy. This paper thus has broader implications for the conduct
of policy analysis and political economy in contestable democracies. The question should
33not be, what is the best \permanent" policy, but rather, given the policy preferences of
the opposition, and the responses of agents within the economy, what is the best policy
each party can pursue, when it is in oce; and what kind of deals can be struck between
the parties to achieve ecient cooperative outcomes.
A Model of Managerial Myopia
The model presented in section 2 of this paper emphasizes that there are agency problems
between the owners and managers of rms. We assumed that as a result, rm managers
maximize the expected discounted value of future dividend 
ows using a discount rate that
includes a premium re
ecting these agency factors, i.e. that managers of rms are myopic.
This appendix illustrates how such a discrepancy in discount rates can be motivated.
The underlying market imperfection is that there exist informational asymmetries be-
tween shareholders and managers. As a result, a manager's eort is not perfectly observ-
able to shareholders. In order to motivate managers to exert eort, their compensation is
performance-based, as discussed by e.g. Baker et al. (1988).
Specically, we follow Chetty and Saez (2007) in assuming that managers hold a fraction
 of their company's stocks to capture the eects of incentive pay. However, managers
do not serve in their job forever. For simplicity, we assume that there is an exogenous
separation probability s every period for managers to lose their jobs, and that they no
longer participate in the company's earnings and dividends after their departure. (In a
more realistic setting, a manager's probability to keep his job would increase the higher
earnings he achieves, which could make him focus even more on short-term performance
and could re-inforce the myopia eect (Stein, 1988). Furthermore, a manager's future job
opportunities could strongly depend on his observed short-run performance at the old rm,
exacerbating the bias.) As a result, managers discount dividend payments every period by
a factor of 1 s











Denoting  = 1 s
1+r we can see that this maximization problem is isomorphic to the setup
in our main model (3).
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